Information Sharing in Joint Research and Development by CHUMA Hiroyuki et al.
%1
RIETI Discussion Paper Series 07-E-019




Future University - Hakodate
OKUNO (FUJIWARA) Masahiro
the University of Tokyo
WATANABE Yasunori
the University of Tokyo
FUJIMURA Shuzo







The Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry
http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/RIETI Discussion Paper E-07-XXX












In today’s science-driven industries, such as the semiconductor industry, ﬁrms are increasingly
engaged in across-ﬁrm research and development projects in the form of a research consortium or a
strategic alliance. Those collaboration processes, however, have complex aspects due to the compet-
ing relationship of the ﬁrms in product markets and will not be successful unless the participating
ﬁrms have enough incentives to reveal their private information and to exert suﬃcient eﬀorts. The
paper attempts to explore the conditions under which ﬁrms have enough incentives to reveal their
information and/or to expend collaborative eﬀorts. Three existing economic models are examined
for this purpose. It is argued that those incentives depend upon the nature of competition in the
product markets, information structure, and the way that each ﬁrm’s private information aﬀects this
competition. The models examined in the paper suggest that some mechanism is necessary to evalu-
ate private technical information of each ﬁrm and to convey it to the other ﬁrms without distortion.
This conclusion coincides with the observed fact that a neutral third-party plays an indispensable
role in a successful research consortium.
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Today’s science-driven industries, as represented by the semiconductor inductry, seem to be facing
unprecedented chages in R&D environments: enormous amounts of necessary R&D investment; wider
scope, growing complexity, and speed-up of the R&D activities; and an increasing degree of marketing
uncertainty. Those changes are making it increasingly diﬃcult for each ﬁrm in the industries to conduct
its whole R&D process in house, giving rise to increased instances of collaborative R&D activities across
ﬁrms in the form of strategic alliances and/or research consortia (Lamoreaux et al. 2003; Sable and
Zeitlin 2004). While proven to be quite eﬀective, however, the collaborative relationship in the R&D
activities has complex aspects, sometimes plagued by conﬂicting interests of participating ﬁrms that
typically compete in the product markets. We believe that information sharing is the key to successful
collaboration and that exploring the incentives for the participants to do so is vital in understanding the
process of collaborative R&D.
This paper explores the incentives of collaborating ﬁrms to share/reveal their private information and
to exert eﬀorts in the joint process of R&D process, by examining existing literature in economics. The
major forms of the real-world collaborative R&D process are known to be strategic alliance and research
consortium. Although understanding the diﬀerence of the two forms should be an interesting topic in
itself, we will not delve into the issue here. Rather we choose to examine the incentives of collaborating
ﬁrms in abstract models. However, we will try to relate the results obtained in the models to the complex
real-world situation wherever possible. In fact, our conclusion is related to the observed practice in
real-world research consortia.
Examining the logic and/or conclusion of three existing economic models, it is argued that the ﬁrms’
incentives to reveal information and to exert eﬀort depend much upon the nature of the competition
in the product markets, information structure, and the way that each ﬁrm’s private information aﬀects
this competition. It is also suggested that some mechanism be necessary to evaluate private technical
information of each ﬁrm and to convey it to other ﬁrms without distortion. This conclusion coincides
with the observed fact that a neutral third-party plays an indispensable role in a successful research
consortium (Chuma 2003).
The organization of the paper is as follow. Section 2 deals with the incentive problems that arise
when ﬁrms are to share private information that cannot be controlled by their actions. In Section
2.1, we examine the canonical model of the oligopoly competition with asymmetric information, where
ﬁrms compete in an oligopoly market with private information. The ex ante incentives of those ﬁrms
to share/reveal information is examined. In this model, it is assumed that ﬁrms can commit to their
revelation/nonrevelation strategy even after receiving private signals. The model may be interpreted as a
situation where ﬁrms are engaged in long-term competing relationships with one another in their product
markets and consider participating in a trade association where they are required to reveal their private
information honestly. In contrast to this model, the model in Section 2.2 does not assume that ﬁrms
can make a commitment to reveal undistorted information upon receiving private signals. Firms decide
whether or not to reveal their information after receiving it and they can distort it if they wish to do
so. This model seems to be closer to the real situation ﬁrms face in a strategic alliance or a research
consortium. The model in Section 2.1, however, provides a benchmark for evaluating the implication
for the welfare of ﬁrms in diﬀerent informational environments. Section 3 deals with the impact of
information sharing at an interim stage on ﬁrms’ incentive to exert eﬀorts in the ongoing process of
collaborative R&D. Finally Section 4 concludes.
12 Incentives to Share Information Regarding Exogenous Param-
eters
2.1 Information Sharing in an Oligopoly Market with Asymmetric Informa-
tion
In launching a new joint project in a strategic alliance or a research consortium, ﬁrms are usually sup-
posed to be willing to cooperate with one another. Sometimes, however, they ﬁnd diﬃculties in initiating
a new joint project, because it requires all participating ﬁrms to reveal their respective information rele-
vant to the project and ﬁrms tend to regard their private information as a source of their competitiveness.
Under what conditions do ﬁrms have incentives to reveal their information required for the joint project?
How does the nature of competitive relations in their product markets aﬀect the incentive to share/reveal
information in the joint R&D process?
A well-known economic model relevant to this question is the model of information sharing in an
oligopoly market wih asymmetric information. The question whether ﬁrms competing in a oligopoly
market with asymmetric information have any incentives to share their private information had long
plagued industrial organization theorists since the mid 1980’s. Various models with diﬀerent conclusions
appeared and it seemed that getting a decisive answer to the question was diﬃcult. However, Raith(1996)
ﬁnally succeeded in giving a lucid answer10. This subsection reviews his model.
Suppose that ﬁrms, indexed by i =1 ,···,n, play a game as follows. At the ﬁrst stage, each ﬁrm
decides whether or not to reveal its private information to be later obtained. After the decision, each
ﬁrm receives a private signal regarding its payoﬀ-relevant parameter and reveals the obtained signal if it
decides to do so at the ﬁrst stage. All the revealed information is pooled and made public. At the second
stage of the game, ﬁrms compete in the oligopoly market, using all the available information. Note that,
in this model, it is assumed that ﬁrms can commit to the revelation decision made at the ﬁrst stage after
receiving any private signal.
The following symmetric quadratic payoﬀ function for ﬁrm i is considered:
πi = αi(τi)+( βn + γnτi −  si)
 
j =i
sj +( βs + γsτi − δsi)si, (1)
where τi is a random parameter with τi ∼ N(0,t s), Cov(τi,τ j)=tn(i  = j). αi(·) is a function, si is
the strategic choice made by ﬁrm i at the second stage competition. βn,γ n, ,β s,γ s,δ are parameters.
To ensure that the payoﬀ function is derivable from a linear demand system, it is assumed that   ∈
(−δ/(n − 1),δ]. To make the payoﬀ function concave, it is also assumed that δ>0.
Imposing diﬀerent restrictions on the parameters, the above payoﬀ function can express various payoﬀs
that arise in Cournot or Bertrand competition in markets with demand or cost uncertainty (in the
Cournot case, quadratic production costs can also be accomodated). Uncertainty takes the form of a
random demand intercept or random marginal cost in this function. With zero mean, τi is a deviation
from the mean demand intercept or mean marginal cost. In the case of demand uncertainty, we have
γs = 1 in both Cournot and Bertrand models. In the case of cost uncertainty in Cournot competition,
γs = −1. In all these three cases, γn = 0, while in the Bertrand competition with cost uncertainty we
have γn  = 0. Whether or not γn = 0 matters a lot in the conclusion below, although this looks just a
technical subtlety.
10For a survey of the related literature, see Vives (1999).
2For example, to obtain a Cournot payoﬀ function with demand uncertainty, let α =0 ,β n =0 ,γ n =
0,γ s =1 .W i t hsi = qi, the payoﬀ function assumes the following form:




This is the proﬁt of ﬁrm i in the Cournot competition when the demand function for ﬁrm i is pi =
βs + τi − qi −  
 
j =i qj and the cost function is ci =( δ − 1)qi. For other speciﬁcations of parameters in
other cases, see Table 1.
Cournot Model Bertrand Model
Demand Uncertainty αi =0 ,β n =0 ,γ n =0 ,γ s =1 αi =0 ,β n =0 ,γ n =0 ,γ s =1
Cost Uncertainty αi =0 ,β n =0 ,γ n =0 ,γ s = −1 αi(τi)=−βsτi,β n =0 ,γ n =  ,γs = δ
Table 1: Parametric Restrictions to Express Various Models of Oligopoly Competition with Uncertainty
Between the ﬁrst and the second stages, ﬁrm i observes a private signal yi := τi + ηi,w h e r eηi is
an observation error. We let τ =( τ1,···,τ n)a n dη =( η1,···,η n). Regarding the error, we assume
ηi ∼ N(0,u ii) for all i,a n dCov(ηi,η j)=un ∈ [0,mini{uii}] for all i  = j. We also assume that for all i
and j, τi and ηj are independent. As a technical assumption, the correlation of the observation errors is
assumed to be less than the correlation of the payoﬀ-relevant parameters: tnuii ≥ tsun for all i.
This formulation encompasses the three distinctive information structure as follows:
• Common Value (CV): ρ(τi,τ j) = 1 for all i  = j:A l lt h eτi’s are equal with probability one.
• Perfect Signals (PS): ηi =0f o ra l li and 0 <ρ (τi,τ j) < 1 for all i  = j.
• Independent Values (IV): ρ(τi,τ j)=ρ(ηi,η j) = 0 for all i  = j.
In CV, all the ﬁrms are subject to a common random parameter, and they observe it with distinct errors.
In PS, ﬁrms can observe without any error their respective payoﬀ-relevant random parameters which may
be correlated with one another. In IV, ﬁrms are subject to independent random parameters.
Since the payoﬀ function is quadratic and the random variable is normally distributed in this model,
we can explicitly solve for a linear strategy, which is known to be the unique equilibrium, and we can
evaluate the size of the equilibrium expected payoﬀ. For all i  = j,w eh a v e∂2πi/∂si∂sj = − .T h u s  is
the parameter expressing strategic complements/substitutes: The game is of strategic substitute variety
when  >0; and of strategic complements variety when  <0.
The equilibrium of the game and the eﬃciency of the equilibrium depend both upon the information
structure and the strategic nature of the game, i.e., whether it is of strategic complements or strategic
substitutes. We state the next proposition without proof.
Proposition 1 (Raith 1996). In the n-ﬁrm two-stage game except for Bertrand competition with cost
uncertainty (where γn  =0 ), unilateral information revelation is the dominant strategy for each ﬁrm
in the independent values (IV), perfect signals (PS) cases, and common value (CV) case with strategic
complements. In the common value (CV) case with strategic substitute, nonrevelation is the dominant
strategy.
Furthermore, eﬃciency is achieved in equilibrium for independent values (IV), perfect signals (PV), and
common value (CV) with strategic complements, because the payoﬀs with complete information sharing
are always higher than those without information sharing for these cases. For common value (CV) case
with strategic substitutes, information sharing is eﬃcient (resp. ineﬃcient) when there is a large (resp.
small) degree of product diﬀerentiation.
3This result can be intuitively explained as follows. First consider each ﬁrm i’s unilateral strategic
decision. In this case, given the revelation decision by the rivals j  = i, the ﬁrm’s revelation behavior does
not alter the ﬁrm’s own information. Thus it only matters how the rivals’ strategic choice at the second
stage change in response to the ﬁrm i’s revelation. In the cases of independent value (IV) and perfect
signals (PS), the revelation of one’s own information induces an increase (decrease) in the correlation
of strategies with strategic complements (resp. substitutes) and this is the “right” change in that it
increases ﬁrm i’s expected proﬁts. In common value (CV), the revelation of one’s information always
increases the correlation of strategies, which increases (decreases) expected proﬁts when the game is of
strategic complements (resp. substitute).
Next consider whether or not all the ﬁrms enter into an ex ante agreement to share information,
that is, whether or not complete information sharing enhances expected proﬁts of all ﬁrms. In the
cases of independent value (IV) and perfect signals (PS), information sharing does not increase the
precision of one’s information, because in independent value (IV) the parameters are independent, and in
perfect signals (PS) one’s information is completely known. However, information sharing induces “right”
change in the correlation of strategies even in those cases, as in the case of unilateral revelation decision.
Thus ﬁrms agree to share information regardless of the parameter values. In common value (CV) case,
information sharing has two eﬀects. On the one hand, by pooling data, it improves the precision of
information regarding the common market environment, which always increases expected proﬁts. On
the other hand, information sharing in this case always increases the correlation of strategies, which is
good for strategic complements and bad for strategic substitute. Thus in the common value (CV) case
with strategic substitutes, expected proﬁts can be lower with information sharing if the game has strong
substites property.
In sum, whether or not ﬁrms have incentives to share information depends on the strategic nature of
the oligopoly competition and the structure of information. However, it is remarkable that, in most cases
(except for the case of common value (CV) case with strategic substitutes) information revelation is the
dominant strategy and sharing information is eﬃcient.
The main shortcoming of this model is that it supposes that ﬁrms can commit to its ex ante dicision
to reveal or not to reveal their information after receiving it. The model seems to describe the situation
where ﬁrms are engaged in a continual oligopoly competition with random but stationary environmental
parameters and consider participating in a trade association which requires participating ﬁrms to reveal
their information honestly. This interpretation does not seem to ﬁt the ﬁrms engagaged in joint R&D
eﬀorts.
Another interpretation might be relevant to the R&D context however. Firms involved in joint R&D
activities often ﬁnd it advantageous to share benchmarking information with respect to their technology,
because they can learn their relative strength/weakness through the benchmarking information. This
phenomenon may be explained with the above result. In the case of Cournot competition with cost
uncertainty and with perfect signals (PS), ﬁrms ﬁnd it proﬁtable to share their benchmarking information
with one another, because they can ﬁne-tune the second stage strategy by somtimes becoming aggressive
and sometimes defensive.
2.2 Strategic Information Revelation and Certiﬁability
As already noted, the model in Section 2.1 assumes that ﬁrms can commit to its ex ante revelation
decision. However, in most real-world situations, especially when it is related to R&D activities, this
assumption seems to be suspicious. The stochastic environments surrounding R&D activities are not
4stationary and frequently once and for all. Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite and Suzumura (1990) propose
and analyze a model in which ﬁrms with private information cannot make such an ex ante commitment
as in the previous model.
Furthermore, the previous model excludes ap r i o r ithe possibility that a ﬁrm wants to manipulate
its rivals’ actions by announcing distorted information. In contrast, Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite and
Suzumura (1990) take such a situation into account. Analyzing such a situation enables us to see the
diﬀerence in outcome between the case where each ﬁrm’s messages are certiﬁable and the case where they
are not.
Now consider a situation where two ﬁrms indexed by i(= 1,2) are engaged in a joint R&D investment
activity11. At the beginning of this game, ﬁrm i already has some initial knowledge, the level of which
is denoted as wi, and exerts eﬀorts xi in this R&D activity, resulting in the ﬁnal level of knowledge
Xi = wi + xi ∈X i ⊂ R. In what follows, we will take Xi to be the ﬁrm i’s strategic choice, although we
can also take xi instead. Here Xi is a compact interval of R.E a c hﬁ r mi chooses the level of Xi knowing
its initial knowledge wi, but not knowing ﬁrm j’s level of initial knowledge wj (j  = i). This is a usual
Bayesian game. Folloing the convention in Bayesian game theory, we will sometimes refer to ﬁrm i with
initial knowledge level wi as ﬁrm i of type wi or the type wi of ﬁrm i.
The gross payoﬀ to ﬁrm i when ﬁrm i chooses Xi and ﬁrm j chooses Xj is denoted as vi(Xi,X j). This
can be interpreted either as the gross proﬁt that ﬁrm i obtains in the product market competition or as
the value of the joint research result for ﬁrm i, when the two ﬁrms’ ﬁnal knowledge proﬁle is (Xi,X j).
Let the cost of R&D eﬀort xi = Xi − wi be ci(xi). That is, the net payoﬀ to ﬁrm i is written as
ui(Xi,X j,w i,w j)=vi(Xi,X j) − ci(Xi − wi) i =1 ,2.
We make the following assumption as to the gross payoﬀ and cost functions.
Assumption 1. For each i, vi(·,·) is continuously diﬀerentiable and has increasing diﬀerences in (Xi,X j)
for j  = i12,a n dci(·) is strictly convex and increasing.
This assumption implies that ui(Xi,X j,w i,w j) is (trivially) supermodular in Xi and has increas-
ing diﬀerences in (Xi,(Xj,w i,w j)). The latter means that there is complementarity between Xi and
(Xj,w i,w j). This condition seems to be satisﬁed in a usual situation arising in a strategic alliance or a
research consortium. In addition, we also assume that the gross payoﬀ functions have positive externali-
ties, that is,
Assumption 2. vi(Xi,·) is strictly increasing in Xj.
These assumptions are satisﬁed in a usual model with which economists are familiar. For example,
suppose that our two ﬁrms are engaged in a Bertrand competition following the R&D activities, and
that Xi appears in the linear demand function as its intercept. Then the resultant equilibrium payoﬀ in
the Bertrand competition has positive externalities asw e l la si n c r e a s i n gd i ﬀ e r ences. Furthermore, this
condition seems to be satisﬁed in usual joint R&D activities.
Recall that the level of initial knowledge wi of ﬁrm i is known to ﬁrm i, but is not known to its
opponent. Assume that the probability distribution function for wi (the belief that ﬁrm j holds with











11The result shown below applies to more general situations. See Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite and Suzumura (1990) and
Van Zandt and Vives (2006). The model can be easily extended to an n-ﬁrm situation.
12If vi is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, this condition is equivalent to ∂2vi/∂Xi∂Xj > 0f o ra l ld i s t i n c ti and j.
5We denote the belief function that ﬁrm i of type wi holds with regard to the opponent’s type by
pi(wj|wi)13. The belief functions are common knowledge. We make the following assumption on the
belief functions.
Assumption 3. pi(wj|wi) is increasing in wi with respect to the order induced by ﬁrst-order stochastic
dominance. That is, if w 
i >w i, then for all wk










This condition is saticeﬁed, for example, when the prior distribution function of the level of knowledge
of both ﬁrms is aﬃlated14 and is trivially saticeﬁed when the prior distribution is independent (that is, if
for all k,l, we have pi(·|wk
i )=pi(·|wl
i)).
A strategy for ﬁrm i is σi : Wi →X i. A strategy proﬁle σ∗ =( σ∗
i ,σ∗
j) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
if for all i and for all wi ∈ Wi,
σ
∗












j)) − ci(Xi − wi)

.
Note that, by Assumptions 1 and 3, this game is a “monotone supermodular game” deﬁned by Vives
and van Zandt (2006), and that there exist a “greatest” and a “least” Bayesian Nash equilibrium, with
a partial ordering on the set of strategies deﬁned as σ 
i ≥ σi whenever σ 
i(wi) ≥ σi(wi) for all wi.
Furthermore, in those equilibria, each player adopts a “monotone strategy” meaning that the strategy is
increasing in the player’s type. That is, for all w 




Let us now introduce a partial ordering to the set of beliefs such that p 
i ≥ pi if and only if, for all
wi ∈ Wi, p 
i(·|wi) ≥ pi(·|wi) holds in the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance. Let p and p  be two
proﬁles of beliefs with p 
i ≥ pi for all i and consider two games Γ(p )a n dΓ ( p) with the same set of
parameters (the set of actions and the payoﬀ functions) except for the belief function. By Assumptions
1 and 3, it can be shown that the greatest equilibrium in Γ(p ) is greater than that in Γ(p).
Let us denote the greatest equilibrium in game Γ(p)a s¯ σ(p) and the conditional expected utility that
ﬁrm i of type wi o b t a i n sa sΠ i(p,wi). Since ¯ σ(p)i si n c r e a s i n gi npj,Π i(p,wi)i si n c r e a s i n gi npj by
Assumption 2. Namely, ﬁrm i of each type can earn higher expected payoﬀ, if the rival has a belief that
puts more probability to higher types of ﬁrm i.
Intuitively, this can be explained as follows. In this game, since wi and Xi are complements to each
other, higher type wi of ﬁrm i chooses higher Xi (that is, ﬁrm i adopts a monotone strategy). On the
other hand, since Xi and Xj are complements, ﬁrm j optimally chooses a higher level of Xj in response
to a higher level of Xi. These together mean that if ﬁrm j believes that ﬁrm i’s type is more likely to be
high, ﬁrm j chooses to exert higher collaborative eﬀorts. Knowing this, since higher eﬀort by ﬁrm j (that
results in higher Xj) bring higher payoﬀ to ﬁrm i,ﬁ r mi of any type wants to make ﬁrm j to believe that
ﬁrm i is of a higher type. Thus, ﬁrm i has incentives to manipulate ﬁrm j’s belief, if it is given such an
opportunity to do so.
Let us now append to the original game a prestage where each ﬁrm, knowing the level of its initial
knowledge, can send a message about it. We henceforth refer to this prestage as the ﬁrst stage of the
augumented game and to the original game as the second stage. Let Mi be the set of message ﬁrm i can
send. We interpret each mi ∈ Mi as the set of ﬁrm i’s types that can send message mi. We allow for the
13This need not be the distribution function derived from a common prior distribution function on (wi,w j).
14See Milgrom and Weber(1982).
6situation that a type of ﬁrm i may not want to reveal anything. We do this by including an element mi
that any type can send. Let M =
 2
i=1 Mi.
In this framework, we can compare the case that each message mi sent by ﬁrm i is certiﬁable with the
case that it is not. Consider ﬁrst the case the messages are certiﬁable. That messages are certiﬁable means
that it can be conﬁrmed to be true. However, this does not necessarily means that the opponent’s type
can be identiﬁed by a sent message, because the type may send a message that can be sent by various other
types. Furthermore, what kind of message is certiﬁable usually depends on concrete physical situations.
For example, in the present context, it would be diﬃcult to certify that ﬁrm i’s knowledge level is at
most such and such, even if it claims so, while a message meaning that ﬁrm i’s knowledge level is at least
some level can be certiﬁed by ﬁrm j with enough expertise or by a third party with appropriate judging
ability. Thinking in this way, what kind of message is certiﬁable seems to be determined independent of
the game played at the second stage.
In order to show that full revelation arises as an equilibrium outcome when messages are certiﬁable,
we make the following assumption as to the message space.
Assumption 4. For each mi ∈ Mi,t h e r ee x i s t sminmi,a n df o re a c hwi,t h e r ee x i s t smi ∈ Mi such that
minmi = wi.
Recall that each mi means the set of types that can send message mi. The second assumption means
that each type wi can send a message meaning that it is at least wi. This assumption describes an
aforementioned physical situation concerning what kind of messages are certiﬁable. In the present context,
the ﬁrst condition means that, for any message, one can identify the minimum knowledge level of the
sending ﬁrm. The latter condition means any type can send a message that make the opponent to believe
it has at least some initial knowlege. These coincide with the situation mentioned above, and so seem to
be satisﬁed in a usual joint R&D activity.
Firm i’s strategy at the ﬁrst stage (reporting strategy) is a mapping ri : Wi → Mi. Since the messages
are certiﬁable, we assume that wi ∈ ri(wi) holds for each wi. This means that each type cannot send
a deceptive message, while it can send an ambiguous one. At the beginning of the second stage, each
type of ﬁrm i updates its belief upon receiving a message proﬁle m =( mi,m j). Let this belief updating
process be denoted by a belief function bi : Wi ×M →P j,w h e r ePj is the set of probability distribution
over Wj. Again by the certiﬁability requirement, we may assume that for all wi ∈ Wi and all m ∈ M,
bi(wi,m) puts probability one on mj(j  = i). Namely a belief is always updated on the premise that the
received message is not deceptive.
The second-stage strategy of ﬁrm i is a measurable function σi : Wi × M →X i. With the ﬁrst-stage
message m given, we have the second-stage belief bi(·,m):Wi →P j and the second-stage strategy
σi(·,m):Wi →X i. That is, given message proﬁle m, ﬁrms update their beliefs and then play the original





satisfy the following conditions:
1. Consistency of Belief: For each i, b∗
i creates a conditional belief function given (wi,(r∗
j(wj))) by
Bayes-updating the original belief wherever possible.
2. Equilibrium at the second stage: For each m ∈ M, σ∗ =( σ∗
i (·,m),σ∗
j(·,m))is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the game Γ((b∗
i(·,m))2
i=1).
3. Equilibrium at the ﬁrst stage: For each i and each wi ∈ Wi,
r∗









7Under these settings, the next proposition holds.
Proposition 2 (Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite and Suzumura 1990). Suppose that Assumption 4 holds
for the messages. Let b∗
i : Wi × M →P j denote a belief formation function such that b∗
i(wi,m) gives
probability one on minmj for all wi ∈ Wi and for all m ∈ M. Also, let r∗
i : Wi → Mi be such that
wi =m i n r∗
i(wi) for all wi. Furthermore, let σ∗(·,m) be a greatest Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the
game Γ((b∗
i(·,m))2




i=1 is a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The messages are fully revealing, since r∗
i is such that wi  = w 
i implies r∗




i correctly forms belief for all equilibrium messages, the b∗
i satisﬁes consistency. Since the strategy
proﬁle σ∗ is Bayesian equilibrium of the Γ((b∗
i(·,m))2
i=1), it suﬃces to show that the message strategy
maximizes expected payoﬀ. The situation in this game is that where each type of each player wants the
other player to believe his type to be as high as possible. However, by the certiﬁability assumption, it
must be that wi ∈ mi. Given the skeptical beliefs b∗
jɼit is optimal for type wi to send a message such
that wi =m i nmi.
With some additional technical conditions, it can also be shown that full revelation is essentially the
unique equilibrium outcome. Let us now turn to the case that messages are not certiﬁable. In this case,
ﬁrm i can send an arbitrary message in Mi. This undermines the credibility of sent messages completely.
The next proposition holds in this case.
Proposition 3. When messages are not certiﬁable, the messages in the ﬁrst stage convey no information
at any perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We ﬁrst show that full revelation is not achieved. Suppose (ri,b i,s i)2
i=1 is a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium that is fully revealing. If the smallest type w1
i of ﬁrm i sends a message ri(w2
i), then it causes
a shift in ﬁrm j belief from his being of type w1
i with probability 1 to his being of type w2
i with probability
1. Hence, his expected payoﬀ can strictly increase. This contradicts the assumption that (ri,b i,s i)2
i=1 is
a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
If some message is informativeɼthere exists a proper subset S of ﬁrm i’s types such that ﬁrm j put
probability 1 on the set with this message. Since all the messages are not fully revealing, there exist more
than one type in this set. If there exists some type wi such that minS>w i, this type can strictly increase
his expected payoﬀ by sending the same message with the set. Suppose then that the set contains lowest
types. In this case, those types can earn higher expected payoﬀ by sending a message that a higher type
that is not in the set is sending. This is a contradiction.
The discussion thus far can be summarized as follows:
1. Under the three conditions regarding the structure of our joint R&D game that follow, there arises
a situation where each type wi of each ﬁrm i wants to induce its rival to hold a higher belief that
puts more probability to higher types;
(a) Xi and Xj are complements;
(b) Xi and wi are complements; and
(c) Xj has a positive externality for ﬁrm i;
2. With two additional conditions regarding certiﬁability of messages that follow, each ﬁrm fully reveals
its type in equilibrium;
(a) The messages sent prior to the joint R&D process is certiﬁable; and
8(b) The structure of certiﬁability is such that message allows the receiver to identify the smallest
type that can send the message.
Let us add some explanation as to why the second set of conditions is required and how it works.
Suppose for example a situation where two ﬁrms are competing in a market of homogeneous goods with
a linear demand curve and are playing a quantity-setting Cournot game. The constant marginal cost of




1 . We call the type of ﬁrm 1 with
marginal cost cH
1 “H-type” and cL
1 “L-type.” Not knowing ﬁrm 1’s type, ﬁrm 2 has to choose its output
in optimal response to the expected output of ﬁrm 1. In such a situation, type L of ﬁrm 1 want to reveal
its type, because it can induce ﬁrm 2 to reduce output and thereby increase its proﬁt if ﬁrm 2 believes
it is indeed type L. Suppose that the set of message is structured as {{H},{H,L}}.T h e nB o t hH-type
and L-type will send a certiﬁable message {H,L} (recall that certiﬁable message has to contain the true
type), so that the message cannot convey any information. If the message space is {{L},{H,L}},t h e n
type L will send message {L} that only type L can send and ﬁrm 2 will identify type L.A t t h e s a m e
time, ﬁrm 2 will successfully identify type H, because type H’s certiﬁable message {H,L}, meaning “I
don’t want to be identiﬁed,” is diﬀerent from type L’s.
Does the full revelation bring higher expected proﬁt to the ﬁrms? The model in this subsection is more
general than the model in Section 2.1., but we can specify the payoﬀ function so that the eﬃciency result
in Proposition 1 can be applied. For example let vi(Xi,X j)=1
4XiXj,c i(Xi − wi)=( Xi − wi)2.T h i s
belongs to the class of payoﬀ functions examined in Section 2.1. Just let τi = wi and si = Xi in (1), and
let α(wi)=−w2
i,β n = γn =0 , = −1/4,β s =0 ,γ s =2 ,δ= 1 for the other parameters. Since the type of
information structure in this model is perfect signals (PS), an equilibrium with full revelation is ex ante
eﬃcient for both ﬁrms.
Finally we would like to add that the analysis in this subsection suggests the necessity of an agent who
ensures unbiased information exchange. Only under the assumption that messages are certiﬁable, ﬁrms
cannot send a deceptive message (ﬁrm i of type wi cannot sent mi with wi / ∈ mi) and the ﬁrm receiving
the message mi can put probability 1 on mi. This condition can be best fulﬁlled by the existence of
a neutral third party who has enough expertise to evaluate the ﬁrms’ messages and communicates the
information to the other ﬁrms without distortion. Thus, the analysis in this subsection suggests that the
involvement of a neutral third party is necessary in a research consortium, where the degree of uncertainty
seems to be higher than in a strategic alliance, as pointed out by Chuma (2003).
3 The Impact of Information Sharing on Incentives in Ongoing
R&D
In the previous models, the information to be shared/revealed is that about exogenous parameters, such
as uncertain cost or demand parameters. This type of information is that which cannot be controlled by
ﬁrms, but should be shared for initiating a new project. In a ongoing joint R&D process, however, ﬁrms
are continually creating new knowledge over time, and sharing the interim research results also seems to
be important for successful completion of the project. In this section, we consider how the sharing of
ongoing research results aﬀects the incentives of ﬁrms engaged in collaboration.
Suppose again that two ﬁrms (i =1 ,2) are engaged in a collaborative R&D activity over two periods
9and choose the level of R&D investment simultaneously and independently. The payoﬀ to ﬁrm i is










i denotes the investment of ﬁrm i in period t, xi =( x1
i,x 2
i) is the investment proﬁle of ﬁrm i
over two periods, Vi(·,·) is the gross proﬁt obtained from the research results, Ci(·) denotes the cost of
research activity.
Using this model, let us examine the impact of the interim information sharing on the ﬁrms’ R&D
investment levels. Suppose that an evaluator acts as such an information mediator. Without such an
evaluator, ﬁrm i cannot know the content or value of the investment made by ﬁrm j( = i) untill the end
of the second period. Thus the ﬁrm i has to choose its second period investment x2
i without knowing x1
j.
On the other hand, with an evaluator who examines information and make it common knowledge to all
the ﬁrms, ﬁrm i knows x1
j when it chooses x2
i at the beginning of the second period. Therefore, ﬁrm i
can condition its second-period investment level x2
i on x1 ≡ (x1
1,x 1
2).
Firms i =1 ,2 are playing a noncooperative game aiming to maximize their respective payoﬀs over two
periods, In terms of game theory, an open-loop Nash equilibrium is realized without any evaluator, while
a closed-loop Nash equilibrium is realized with an evaluator.
When there is no evaluator, a Nash equilibrium is an investment decision proﬁle (x∗∗
1 ,x∗∗
2 ) that satisﬁes











=0 ∀i =1 ,2,t =1 ,2. (3)
When there is an evaluator who evaluates investments made in the ﬁrst period and makes the informa-
tion common knowlege, ﬁrms i =1 ,2 know the realization of x1 ≡ (x1
1,x 1
2). Therefore a Nash equilibrium












=0 ∀i =1 ,2. (4)




Expecting that the above outcome realizes in the second period, the payoﬀ function to be maximized





























=0 ∀i =1 ,2. (6)




2 )t h a t
satisﬁes (6) and (4) simultaneously.
Comparing equation (6) with equation (3), we see the diﬀerence of equilibrium conditions lies in the




i and it is easy to see that there are two cases that this term becomes
positive.
Let us say that the second-period investment exerts positive (negative) externality when ∂Vi/∂x2
j is
positive (resp. negative) for all i and all i  = j and that the dynamic game is investment-inducing
10(investment-reducing) when ∂x2∗
j /∂x1
i is positive (resp. negative) for all i and all i  = j. Then the two
cases that give rise to a positive strategic eﬀect are:
(1) The case where second-period investment exerts positive externality and the dynamic game is
investment-inducing; and
(2) The case where second-period investment exerts negative externality and the dynamic game is
investment-reducing.
The sign of ∂x2∗
j /∂x1





j. This is positive if Vj has increasing diﬀerences in (x1,x2), namely the investment levels
made by ﬁrm i and ﬁrm j are complements to each other.
We think that usual situations arising in research consortia correspond to the ﬁrst case above with
positive strategic eﬀects; Second-period investment exerts positive externality and the dynamic game is
of the investment-inducing kind. The second case that the strategic eﬀects are positive is the one where
second-period investment exerts negative externality and the dynamic game is investment-reducing. This
situation arises when part suppliers are engaged in a tournament game competing for delivering a part
to an assembler. See Konishi, Okuno-Fujiwara and Suzuki (1996) for the analysis of this case.
Let us now regard the left-hand side of equation (6) and equation (3) as functions of x1
i. Due to the
second-order conditions, those functions are decreasing in x1







Namely, we have shown that, in the standard case of research consortium, both ﬁrms’ equilibrium in-
vestment levels are increased if an evaluator evaluates their interim investment levels from a neutral
standpoint and make them common knowledge to the participants.
The model in this section has shown that the presence of an evaluator can exert a positive eﬀect on
ﬁrms’ incentive to make eﬀorts in a joint R&D activity by changing the strategic nature of the game.
We conjecture that the model can be changed and/or extended without changing the basic result. First,
we may change the above game so that the ﬁrms move sequentially rather than simultaneously without
changing the basic result. Second, it may be that the evaluator does not have to see the investment
levels in the ﬁrst period completely accurately as in the above model. As long as the evaluator makes
the information concerning x1 more accurate, say by reducing noises, his presence will have an impact
on the level of investments.
Some more interesting questions awaits further exploration in relation to this model. First, it would
be interesting to examine how the investment level changes when we increase the frequency of interim
information exchange. Second, we may be able to integrate this model with the model in Section 2.2 by
incorporating initial level of knowledge wi for each ﬁrm i and allowing it to reveal this private information.
In that case also, it is conjectured that full revelation equilibrium obtains if the revelation is investment-
inducing. Third, it would be interesting to examine the ﬁrms’ incentives to reveal their ﬁrst-period
investment levels honestly, when they are allowed to send messages regarding this information. Finally,
in view of the importance of the evaluator’s role, his incentive to do the job correctly should be explored.
4C o n c l u s i o n
In the recent changes of economic environments, ﬁrms are increasingly engaged in across-ﬁrm collabora-
tive R&D activities in the form of a research consortium and/or a strategic alliance. Those processes can
11often be conﬂict-ridden, and will not be successful unless the participating ﬁrms have enough incentives
to reveal their private information that is relevant to the collaborative process and to exert suﬃcient
eﬀorts. The present paper attempts to explore the conditions under which ﬁrms have enough incentives
to reveal their information and/or to expend collaborative eﬀorts, examining three existing economic
models.
What implications for the eﬀective joint R&D activity can we draw from the examination of these
models? First, the models we discussed enable us to identify rigorous conditions under which ﬁrms
have incentives to reveal their information and/or to exert collaborative eﬀorts in respective models. To
the extent that those models reﬂect reality, those conditions are relevant to the successful collaborative
R&D activities. The incentives to reveal their information and/or to exert collaborative eﬀorts are
shown to depend largely on the nature of the oligopolistic game ﬁrms play (strategic substitutes/strategic
complements or positive externality), information structure of the ﬁrms’ private signals (common value,
perfect signal, independent values), and how the private information aﬀects the ﬁrms’ payoﬀs in the game
(complements/substitute). Roughly put, when the ﬁrms’ R&D eﬀorts are advantageous to each other,
then we can ﬁnd some mechanism to induce their eﬀorts. However, it has also be shown this is not
suﬃcient.
Second, and more importantly, as suggested by the models in Section 2.2 and Section 3, it is neces-
sarily that information revealed by ﬁrms is correctly evaluated and communicated to the others without
distortion. Without any mechanism to ensure such unbiased information exchange, the incentives for
truth-telling and making appropriate eﬀorts might be severely impaired. The existence of such a mecha-
nism seems to be the key to successful collaboration.
When the conﬂict of interests between ﬁrms can be complex, the role of information mediation may best
be played by a third party. Then the third party should fulﬁll two requirements. On the one hand, it has
to have enough technological expertise to appropriately evaluate the technological information revealed
by each participating ﬁrm. On the other, it should be neutral to the extent that all the participating
ﬁrms believe it not to convey distorted information.
Third, if some deviation from the model analyses is permitted, we would like to add that the third
party above has another important role to play. The alignment/disalignment of interest among ﬁrms can
be sometimes so complex that ﬁrms may not be able to grasp the situation they face correctly, while,
in the models examined so far, ﬁrms exactly know the complementarity/substitute parameters. In such
cases, if the third party is trusted by all ﬁrms and can collect enough payoﬀ-relevant information from
them, it can act as a kind of matchmaker to help ﬁrms exploit proﬁt opportunities.
Despite our emphasis on the important role that can be played by the third party, we have not consid-
ered the third party’s incentives in this paper. Furthermore, we may be able to integrate and extend the
models in Section 2.2 and Section 3 to consider ﬁrms’ incentive to reveal information as to their initial
level of knowledge and/or interim accumulated knowledge levels. We would like to leave those issues for
the subjects of another paper.
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